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SUMMARY 
The aim of this research was to find out whether it would be 
possible to produce specific, genuine, causal impressions of motion 
braking, in the visual field, which could compare with causal im-
pressions of pushing, launching, tracing a.s.o. as described by Mi-
chotte, in his work «La perception de la causalite». 
For this, we tried to determine the simplest conditions of stimu-
lation which induced obseivers to mention in their responses a causal 
influence of braking. 
The experiments consisted mainly in suddenly slowing down the 
movement of an object moving along a slit. This was taking place 
either without any accessory background structure, or at the moment 
the object was reaching a different coloured part of the background, 
or again when it had reached another, stationary, object over which 
it passed. 
It was in this latter case that causal responses were most frequent, 
whilst they were sporadic in the former. The passing of the object 
over a different part of the background proved to be completely 
ineffective, under various time conditions, since the results were of 
the same order when the colour of the background was uniform. On 
the contrary, passing over another object was more efficient, espe-
cially when the duration of the slowmovement was limited to the 
superposition period of the two objects. 
Changes in the stimulation system thus exerted a considerable in-
fluence on the frequency of the causal responses, but on the other 
hand had none on their content. 
The analyses of their content clearly showed that the braking in-
* Cette contribution est publiee ici pour la premiere fois. 
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fluence was not perceived, but inferred from the perceptual data, 
permitting «understanding» on the basis of acquired knowledge. 
The main interest of our research seems therefore to be that it 
established the possibility of using an objective criterion justifying 
the distinction between responses corresponding to specific impres-
sions of causation and responses corresponding to inferences. In the 
first case alterations of the stimulus system brings about parallel 
changes in the content of the responses, whereas in the latter the 
responses remain practically unchanged; only their frequency varies. 
RESUME 
Le but de ces recherches etait de tacher de provoquer chez des ob-
servateurs des impressions visuelles de freinage d'un mouvement, 
presentant un caractere originel et specifique comme celles du lan-
cement, etc., decrites par Michotte. 
A cet effet on a tente de determiner les conditions de stimulation 
les plus simples qui amenaient les sujets a mentionner dans leurs re-
ponses une influence causale de freinage au cours des experiences 
auxquelles ils etaient soumis. 
Ces experiences consistaient essentiellement a ralentir brusque-
ment le mouvement d'un mobile qui se deplacait le long d'une fente. 
Ceci se produisait soit en 1'absence de tout accessoire, soit au mo-
ment ou le mobile atteignait un niveau a partir duquel le fond de-
vant lequel il se mouvait presentait une autre couleur, soit au mo-
ment ou il atteignait un objet immobile devant lequel il passait. 
C'est dans ce dernier cas que les reponses causales ont ete les 
plus nombreuses alors que, dans les premiers, elles etaient sporadi-
ques. La coincidence du ralentissement avec le passage devant une 
autre zone du fond s'est montree tout a fait inoperante dans diver-
ses conditions temporelles, les resultats etant du meme ordre que 
pour un fond uniforme. Par contre le passage devant un autre ob-
jet etait beaucoup plus favorable, et cela principalement lorsque le 
ralentissement se limitait a la duree de superposition des objets. 
Les modifications du systeme de stimulation ont done exerce une 
influence tres nette sur la frequence des reponses a signification 
causale. 
D'autre part, elles semblent n'en avoir eu aucune sur leur con-
temn. Celui-ci manifestait de facon constante que Taction de frei-
nage n'etait pas percue, mais seulement inferee a partir des donn£es 
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perceptives dont il fournissait une explication empruntee a l'expe-
rience acquise. 
L'interet majeur de nos recherches reside, semble-t-il, en ce qu'elles 
indiquent experimentalement la possibility d'utiliser un critere objec-
tif pour dislinguer les cas dans lesquels il y a une impression cau-
sale specifique, de ceux dans lesquels l'influence causale est inferee. 
Dans la premiere eventuality, les modifications que Ton fait subir 
au systeme des excitants entraine des alterations paralleles et syste-
matiques dans le contenu des reponses des sujets. 
Dans le second cas au contraire, le contenu des reponses demeure 
semblable et ce n'est que leur frequence qui vane. 
In his experiments on <-The perception of causality) (1, 2, 3) 
Michotte was able to demonstrate the existence of many kinds 
of perceptually given causal impressions, like pushing, kicking, 
throwing, tracing, erasing, etc. According to Michotte these im-
pressions are primary ones, i.e. they should be conceived of as 
specific perceptual responses directly elicited by a definite sys-
tem of stimuli. 
Theoretically Michotte reduces them to one basic perceptual 
scheme called «ampliation», essentially a particular kinetic 
structure corresponding to a stimulus system which includes 
two stimulus objects moving in the same direction. 
It follows that it would be impossible to induce causal im-
pressions by stimulus conditions which don't fit in with this 
basic scheme. Examples of these negative cases are «braking» 
(causally determined slowing down of movement) (1, p. 217) or 
«attraction» (l.p.216). Indeed in some experiments where braking 
or attraction were displayed, it was found that subjects did not 
report causal impressions (1. pp. 99, 154). For example one could 
expect braking responses in some of his pushing experiments: 
An object A moves in the direction of a stationary object B. After 
reaching it, both move with equal speed, i.e. juxtaposed in the 
same direction of A's original movement. When the velocity of 
A and B after their junction is much less than A's original ve-
locity (1, p. 156), one could have the impression that A's speed is 
braked by B. In this case however, nobody observed that the 
encounter with obstacle B caused the slowing down of A. 
Basing oneself on Michotte's ampliation theory one could not 
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expect braking answers in this case. When B's movement has to 
be the cause of A's slowing down, object B has to be the «centre 
de reference» of A's movement after their meeting, for it is the 
essence of ampliation that the dominant movement (the move-
ment of the «centre de reference") expands over the patient (the 
other object). In that case only does one have a causal impres-
sion. It is however clear that A's movement, and not B's, will 
exert the dominance once the junction completed, a dominance 
it necessarily obtains during the period A moves alone. This is 
also the case in all other imaginable braking situations (1, p. 
99); the object that causes the braking cannot be endowed with 
the dominant movement, therefore there is no ampliation and 
one cannot have a causal impression in the sense of MICHOTTE. 
One may wonder however, if Michotte's theory does not 
conflict with the current opinion that we can very well perceive 
visually that a car is being braked or that some iron object is 
being attracted by a magnet. The question arises then, whether 
conditions different from those stipulated by Michotte might 
not also produce causal impressions. The only study along these 
lines which is known to us is that by Kanizsa and Metelli (4) who 
claim to have found a visual effect of attraction that would be 
immediately given as such. However, since the authors neither 
mention any quantitative results, nor even make it clear whet-
her or not their subjects knew beforehand what they were sup-
posed to see, this experiment cannot be considered as conclu-
sive. 
Our experiments are dealing with the braking effect only. 
Let us suppose that subjects are shown a rotating disc which 
is brought to a standstill by the action of a brakeblock; when 
asked what they have seen, most subjects would probably ans-
wer that they saw a «braking» of some kind. However, our 
problem is: does this refer to a specific perceptual structure 
of «checking the movement", or should one say that these sub-
jects saw something (the approach of the block and the slowing 
down of the wheel) which they then interpret as braking ? Such 
an interpretation could be based on previously acquired know-
ledge. Moreover one should not forget that the word «braking» 
can be used in a wide variety of situations: the skater comes 
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to a stop by altering the position of his skates, a cart gets stuck 
in the sand, a driver puis on the brakes (in which latter case 
one cannot even see how the brake works), etc. 
In our experiments we have made an attempt to reproduce 
the essential component of braking situations like those just 
mentioned, using a very simple and schematic stimulus system. 
We expected that the role of previous experience might thus 
be eliminated as much as possible. Also it might then be pos-
sible to discover by systematically changing the stimulus con-
ditions, which perceptual structures would induce our subjects 
to mention causal impressions in their protocols. 
We made use of Michotte's rotating disc device (1. p. 25-32). This 
consists of a circular cardboard disc, with a diameter of 50 cm. On these 
discs are drawn arcs of circles having the same center as the disc, 
as well as Archimedian spirals. The disc could be rotated behind 
an opaque screen with a horizontally radial slit of 5 mm width and 
a variable length. Under these conditions an observer will perceive 
arcs on the rotating disc as unmoving rectangles in the slit, whereas 
spirals will be seen as moving rectangles. In this ways a number of 
moving and stationary figures can be produced in the slit. The velo-
city of the moving figures depends on the characteristics of the 
spirals as well as on the rotation speed of the disc. A more complete 
description of this technique can be found in 1 loc.cit, 5, p. 186 
and 6 (p. 183-185). 
Our first experiments were to find out whether subjects would 
give causal responses when presented with the simplest possible 
stimulus pattern. 
Experiment I. 
The background behind the slit is in two parts: white at the left 
(75 mm) and black at the right (25 mm). Left of the separation line 
a red rectangle (5X10 mm) is visible, its right side being at a distance 
of 60 mm from the separation of black and white. Eventually this rec-
tangle starts moving to the right (313.3 cm/sec). At the precise time 
the left side of this rectangle coincides with the separation line, the 
velocity changes to 4.7 cm/sec. The object then moves at this con-
stant speed over the black part of the background until it disappears 
behind the screen on the right. 
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The stimulus was presented to 50 «fresh» subjects, i.e. subjects 
who had no knowledge of the purpose of the experiment and who 
were merely requested to describe what they saw (the instruction was 
given this way in all experiments, which were always made on fresh 
observers). 
Basing ourselves on Michotte's theory, we could not expect reports 
of primary causal impressions in this experiment. 
Only seven subjects (14%) used causal expressions. A re-
sponse is called a causal one when the subject does not only 
mention the slowing down of the movement, but also explains 
it by reference to something linked with the black that opposes 
resistance to the red object. For instance: «It looks like the red 
being held up by something on the separation between white and 
black». Four subjects mentioned a friction between red and 
black as cause, and two subjects a greater density of the sur-
roundings on the black. 
In this experiment two changes occur simultaneously: a) a 
sudden slackening of the movement, b) the object arrives in 
front of a different background. It would perhaps be possible 
to heighten the frequency of causal reports by altering the time 
relations between the two events. 
Experiment II. 
Three different discs were used: 
1. As in Exp. I the background of a white part at the left and a 
black part at the right. The red object's (5X10 mm) right side is 
initially 85 mm to the left of the separation line. Then it moves 
to the right at a speed of about 20 cm/sec. When it is 25 mm at the 
left of the separation line, its speed changes to about 3 cm/sec. and 
at this speed the object moves on until it disappears on the right of 
the slit. 
• 2. Like 1.. except that the object is initially 45 mm on the left of 
the boundary line and only changes speed when it is clearly upon 
the black background: i.e. when its left side is 5 mm over the boun-
dary line. 
3. Like 2., with the difference that the object changes speed still 
later, i.e. when its left side is 35 mm on the right of the separation 
line. 
All subjects were shown the three patterns successively in all 
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presentation orders. Using four subjects in every order, 24 su-
jects in all were involved. 
The results were very similar to those of Exp. I. Only three 
subjects (12 %>) mentioned braking impressions. One of them 
with all three displays, and two others with display N" 2. We 
were not able to establish any influence of the different time 
conditions. It would thus seem as though the relationship be-
tween the slackening of the motion and the passing of the 
object in front of a different background were, for the practi-
cal purposes, irrelevant to our problem. 
So far, some interesting conclusions may already be drawn: 
1. The immense majority of observers described the slowing 
down of the movement and its location and considered the 
slackening as spontaneous; only very few subjects did men-
tion a causal relationship (in accordance with Michotte's 
theory). 
2. In the few cases of causal reports, the supposed cause was 
always something which was not given in the display, e.g. 
a sort of resistance or viscosity where the background was 
black. 
It seems thus as though the background played practically 
no role at all, the main thing being the change of speed itself, 
which in some cases induce observers to think of, or to infer, a 
possible cause and to formulate different hypotheses concerning 
their nature. In these conditions therefore, no specific, genuine 
causal impressions are reported. It might seem at first glance 
that such a result should have been expected, owing to the sche-
matic and artificial character of the display. But, and this is an 
essential point that should be borne in mind all the way through 
when discussing investigations of this kind, in the case of ex-
periments on «pushing» etc., the display is equally schematic 
and artificial and besides, the observers may know, and in fact 
do generally know that the display consists only of spots of 
colour painted on paper and that there is no «real» pushing at 
all. Nevertheless, this does not prevent them from reporting that 
they actually see one object pushing the other. 
The negative results obtained up to this point induced us to 
try different changes in the display in order to produce another 
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kind of structure of the perceptual field which could possibly 
alter the nature of the responses. Since the background had 
proved to be ineffective, we tried to bring in a second object 
in front of which the first would move after reaching it, its 
motion being slackened at that moment. 
Experiment III. 
The background is 170 mm in length. At the left, 5 mm from the 
edge is a red rectangle (5X10 mm), and at a distance of 60 mm from 
its right side is the left of a black rectangle (5X25 mm). The white 
background extends then 70 mm further to the right. (As a conse-
quence of the enclosure principle the black rectangle is seen in this 
case as a «figure» and constitutes thus the second object). Eventually 
the red object starts moving to the right (31.3 cm/sec). The moment 
the red object's left side coincides with the black's left, the velocity 
changes to 4.7 cm/sec. and the object moves on at this constant 
speed until it disappears behind the screen on the right. 
This experiment differs from Exp. I by the white part added to 
the right of the black. 
Among 50 fresh subjects. 17 (34%) reported having seen the 
red object being braked when it moved over the black part. 
This number is significantly higher than the number found in 
Exp. I (chi-square: p < . 05). Thus there is an important increase in 
the frequency of the causal responses, but their nature remains 
the same as in the previous experiments. An inspection of the 
individual protocols makes this clear enough. First, 13 subjects 
who reported a braking impression made use of expressions 
!ike: «It appears as if...it gives the impression that...one could 
believe that...» etc. So, it is obvious again that the stimulus sys-
tem did only suggest the idea of «checking» the motion. Fur-
thermore, 4 of our subjects did refer to examples taken from 
everyday experience. They thought of the black as of a tunnel 
through which the red object could only proceed with difficulty; 
or the red object was imagined as a cart coming from a highway 
on to a track, or as a rolling ball landing in the sand. One of 
them said: «The red falls into the butter»; 9 subjects did not 
refer to such specific points and only said that the red object 
appeared to be grating the black or got stuck to it, or called the 
black magnetic, all physical factors not present in the display. 
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This rise in number of causal reports stimulated us to stress 
still more the connection between the slowing down and the 
passing in front of the black. In the next experiment there is 
not only a slowing down of the movement of the red object 
when it arrives at the black, but this slackened movement is 
also restricted to the period the red passes over the black, so 
that the movement resumes its original speed once it is on the 
right white part of the background. 
Experiment IV. 
The difference with Exp. Ill is (hat the velocity of the red rec-
tangle changes to 31.3 cm/sec. the moment its left side is on the 
black's right. So the movement proceeds in three phases: fast-slow-
fast. 
Out of 50 subjects 29 reported the red to be braked (58%). 
This number is significantly higher than that found in Exp. Ill 
(chi-square: p<C. 05) and also obviously better than that in Exp. 
I (chi-square: p < . 001). Our brake response criterion was the 
same as described in connection with Exp. I. 
Here too, many (16) subjects who reported a braking, descri-
bed the situation in terms of «as if», and 21 subjects referred to 
the influence of unperceived properties or factors (magnetic for-
ces, grating, etc.). 
It is noteworthy that in spite of the large increase in the 
number of causal responses, only 4 subjects were disturbed by 
the sudden acceleration of the red, after it had passed the black. 
They groped for all kinds of peculiar explanations for this 
accelaration. like «The black pushes the red away», «The black 
fires the red», «The red arrives upon a conveyor». The other ob-
servers satisfied themselves by simply saying that the red was 
being braked and afterwards just went on as before. Strangely 
enough, the subjects did not explicitly refer to a self-moving 
object, the motion of which would simply be temporarily re-
strained by passing in front of another object. 
The following experiment is designed to establish further the 
necessity of a second object of some kind to be present in order 
to produce braking reports. 
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Experiment V. 
The difference with Exp. TV is that the background is entirely 
white, so that the movement of the red object (fast-slow-fast) pro-
ceeds in front of a white background. 
This display was presented to 15 subjects. Only three of them 
(20%) said they saw the object being braked by something they 
could not see, but supposed to be working. This result differs 
significantly from that of Exp. IV (Fisher exact probability test: 
p<C. 01). Curiously enough, this temporary deceleration did not 
make our subjects think ol a braking factor. If one compares the 
results with those of Exp. I and II, one notices that they are 
nearly equal (Fisher test: no significant differences), which 
proves once more that the structure of the background is not 
an important factor in producing braking reports. 
It is clear that all these experiments point to the same general 
conclusions. We have altogether 59 (on a total of 189) records 
of causal responses given independently by fresh observers who 
had never taken part in similar experiments; and in all these 
cases the «causes» were always extrinsic to the perceptual struc-
ture (this refers of course only to our own research '). None of 
the subjects ever reported seeing one object checking the 
motion of another, whereas in MICHOTTE'S experiments on causa-
tion, observers constantly said that they saw the moving object 
pushing the other ahead. 
Nevertheless the slackening has been related to the second 
object, but this happened by means of a «hidden» property of 
this object, like viscosity and so on. These references to numer-
ous unperceived factors show at once that in this case we are 
not dealing with a specific impression of «braking», but that the 
1
 One may wonder what the results would have been if still other displays 
had been used, for instance displays using the more «natural» gradual dece-
leration. Trials to perform such an experiment showed that people expe-
rienced considerable difficulties in perceiving any difference between a sud-
den deceleration of the treble as well as a gradual deceleration of the same 
order. A still larger gradual decrease in speed is not easily practicable with 
the rotating discs device. Besides, a large number of subjects having actually 
described the sudden change in speed as gradual, we did not consider the 
graduality of speed change as an important variable. 
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perceptual data of the slackening of the first object during its 
passage over another object induce a number of observers to 
think of explanatory hypotheses of this fact, on the basis of 
knowledge acquired in the past. We have learned that a mo-
ving body does not change its velocity without the intervention 
of some cause and when we perceive a change of that kind, we 
are liable to look for such a cause, which in the case of our 
experiments could only be guessed. 
Furthermore these experiments have clearly shown that even 
the awakening of the idea of the cause was dependent on the 
structure of the display — the cases, scanty in experiments I, II 
and V, became very numerous in III and IV, in which the sys-
tem of stimuli was such that a strong connection was establis-
hed between the slackening and the passage in front of the se-
cond object. Needless to say the latter displays are much more 
similar to daily life conditions under which a physical braking 
takes place, and thus also better fitted to recall the idea of such 
an event. This is easy to understand, because in most cases the 
slowing down of movement is produced by friction, when a bo-
dy is moving over another. Furthermore, it seems that the most 
current concept of braking is that of a temporary slowing down 
produced by counteracting for a while a continuously working 
force, like gravity, a mechanical motor, or voluntary human 
movement. It is clear that our set-up corresponds perfectly to 
the sense that may be inferred from the above-mentioned situ-
ations. On the other hand, it appears that the 4 subjects who 
experienced some difficulties in reporting what they saw, due 
to the increase of speed after braking (Exp. IV), gave a some-
what different meaning to the word «braking» by taking only 
the inertia into account. 
But one point ought still to be specially stressed, namely the 
fact that if a change in the system of stimuli had an influence 
on the frequency of the causal responses, it had none on their 
kind or their nature. They remained all the way through exam-
ples of: «It is as if», generally followed by a hypothesis about 
some physical features liable to check the motion. 
Now this is something entirely different from what happens 
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in the experiments on «pushing» and the like, for in the latter 
cases, gradual changes in the system of stimuli bring about 
gradual changes in the kind of descriptions given by the obser-
vers. This shows, as MICHOTTE has repeatedly pointed out, a 
direct dependence of the responses upon the stimulus pattern. 
In our experiments, on the contrary, the description remained 
practically the same in spite of great differences in the displays. 
This is a fact which supports very strongly the conclusion drawn 
from the differences in the content of the verbal responses in 
the two cases. 
Another experiment substantiates the same statement. We 
wanted to know whether the second object should be present 
in the field before it is reached by the moving one. This would 
seem probable, if any causal response were to be expected. 
Experiment VI. 
In the slit (170X5 mm) is a red rectangle (5X10 mm) at 5 mm 
distance from the left side. The background is entirely white. At a 
certain moment the red starts moving to the right (12 cm/sec). When 
it has moved 60 mm, the black object suddenly appears in such a 
way that its left border coincides with the right side of the red 
object. At the same time the latter changes speed to 1.8 cm/sec; it 
moves at this speed over the black part and at the moment it has 
altogether left it, the latter disappears again and the red object 
resumes its initial speed of 12 cm/sec, moving on until it disap-
pears behind the screen. 
This experiment is thus similar to Exp. IV, the only difference 
being that the second object appears suddenly at the moment 
of the slowing down of the movement and disappears when it 
resumes its former speed. 
Using the velocities of Exp. IV this stimulus configuration ap-
peared to be confusing; too many things happened together. 
Therefore we used slower speeds, maintening their ratio. Only 
12 observers took part in this experiment, but 7 of them (58 %) 
said that the red object was being braked at the appearence of 
the black. The difference in results with Exp. I is significant 
(Fisher exact probability test: p < . 003). 
However, it once again appeared that 6 out of the 7 causal 
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responses were of the «as if» type. The display made the obser-
vers recall braking situations. One of our subjects even said that 
it was not the black object that braked the red one, but someth-
ing else not visible, hidden behind the screen. This is therefore 
another case in which a considerable change in the display did 
not affect the results accordingly, these being similar to those 
of Exp. IV. Finally, in order to verify our main conclusion that 
the causal responses given by our observers were not descrip-
tions of what they actually saw, but were essentially hypotheses 
based on acquired knowledge and framed in order to explain 
the perceived changes, we carried out a last experiment, in 
which the speed ratio was inverted; this resulted in a situation 
practically never met in ordinary life. 
Experiment VII. 
The set-up is similar to that of Exp. IV. but the red rectangle moves 
to the right at the speed of 4.7 cm/sec. until its left side coincides 
with the black's left side. Its speed increases then suddenly to 31.3 
cm/sec. to resume its former value when its left side coincides with 
the black's right. Thus we have the three steps: slow-rapid-slow. 
This experiment is the «:everse» of Exp. IV. Whereas in the 
latter the object decelerated while passing in front of the black, 
in Exp. VII it accelerates, the ratio between the two velocities 
being the same. 
In the above situation, the connecting factors of simultaneity 
and equality of duration and trajectory oi the two changes (ac-
celeration and passing) are thus also at work, but on the other 
hand, the situation shows little conformity with everyday events 
and common physical knowledge could hardly be applied to it. 
Among the 20 subjects taking part in the experiment, only 3 re-
ported a causal connection (15%) between passing over the black 
and acceleration, and their reports were rather poor. One sub-
ject said that the black was protruding so that «the red tumbles 
from the black»; a second said that the red was being pushed 
by the black and the third one that «the red jumped over the 
black because it perceived the black as an obstacles 
The difference with the results of Exp. IV is striking (signi-
ficant at the .02 level, Fisher test). Although the structural fac-
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tors which tend to bind strongly together the change in speed 
and the passing of an object over another are the same, the 
number of the «causal responses" drops at once according to 
prediction, and this is quite natural since current life does not 
provide us with ready-made causal concepts fitting to such 
cases. 
It is also interesting to compare this experiment with those 
of MICHOTTE on the «release effect», which takes place when 
an object starts moving after an impact, but at a greater speed 
than the object which hits it (1, p. 116). The reports of the obser-
vers are very different in this case from those obtained in the 
experiments on «pushing» and the like. There is no question of 
a shock «producing» the movement of the second object any 
more, this movement being reported as autonomous and just 
«released" at the moment of the impact; the observers explicitly 
stress the fact that they have an impression of direct "depen-
dence" of the movement upon the impact — a crude unspecified 
type of causation. They also try to find out some possible ex-
planations of the fact in the same way as in our experiments. 
Whether or not our subjects also had an impression of such an 
indefinite «dependence» of the change of speed on the passing 
over the second object, we have no reason to believe because 
they don't mention it, and this assumption is by no means re-
quired in order to understand our results. 
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
Considering all these data, it seems that the most interesting 
result of our investigations lies in the experimental evidence 
that an objective criterion may help to establish and justify the 
distinction between two classes of causal verbal responses 
elicited by visual situations: 
1" Verbal responses corresponding to genuine, specific causal 
visual impressions. 
2° Cases in which the causal bond is not actually perceived, 
but inferred from perceptual data of another kind (2, p. 
389 sq.). 
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It has been shown that in these latter cases, the content ol 
the verbal statements does not vary in nature, in spite of con-
siderable changes in the patterns of the display, these bringing 
about mere differences in the frequency of the causal responses. 
In the first case, on the contrary, as MICHOTTE has been able to 
demonstrate it, there is a close parallelism between changes in 
the displays and corresponding in the content of the responses. 
Further research will be needed to find out how far this cri-
terion may be applied to other causal situations, but it seems 
that one can reasonably believe in its general value. 
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